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Abstract—Near Field Communication (NFC) technology is 
based on a short range radio communication channel which 
enables users to exchange data between devices. With NFC 
technology, mobile services establish a contactless transaction 
system to make the payment methods easier for people. Although 
NFC mobile services have great potential for growth, they have 
raised several issues which have concerned the researches and 
prevented the adoption of this technology within societies. 
Reorganizing and describing what is required for the success of 
this technology have motivated us to extend the current NFC 
ecosystem models to accelerate the development of this business 
area. In this paper, we introduce a new NFC payment 
application, which is based on our previous “NFC Cloud Wallet” 
model [1] to demonstrate a reliable structure of NFC ecosystem. 
We also describe the step by step execution of the proposed 
protocol in order to carefully analyse the payment application 
and our main focus will be on the Mobile Network Operator 
(MNO) as the main player within the ecosystem. 
Keywords—Near Field Communication; Security; 
Mobiletransaction; GSM authentication. 
I. INTRODUCTION  
During the past decade, the concept of contactless card 
technology was introduced to be used in transport, ticketing 
and in retail. The technology helps people save time by just 
holding their contactless cards against a reader in a close 
proximity instead of having to insert the paper cards in and 
taking it out of the train entrance gates for example. With NFC 
technology, mobile phones can have additional functionality 
to act as a contactless card to be used as an easy method of 
payment. Successful development of NFC technology has 
recently started in some countries where companies offer 
several services based on the contactless card technology and 
mobile phones. Although this technology is increasingly 
becoming mainstream, it still has issues that need to be 
addressed [2]. These issues are mainly security concerns with 
Secure Element (SE) personalization, management, ownership 
and architecture that can be exploitable by attackers to delay 
the adaption of NFC within societies. The purpose of this 
paper is to extend Pourghomi’s[1] - this model will be referred 
as “NFC Cloud Wallet” in this and our future papers - by 
proposing a complete transaction mechanism based on NFC 
and GSM networks. 
This model is based on cloud computing for the 
management of payment applications in secure element within 
the NFC ecosystem. The details of this model are described in 
Section IV of this paper. As the authentication mechanism of 
our extended model is based on GSM, we will discuss the 
GSM authentication later in this paper. We also aim to 
accelerate the development of NFC mobile payment services 
by describing the NFC ecosystem in order to raise the 
attention of business players in terms of the new potential 
models that can be implemented in order to achieve a cost 
beneficial and less complex ecosystem framework. 
Our contribution in this paper is to extend the NFC Cloud 
Wallet model and to provide a complete transaction solution 
based on this model. We propose a model based on the 
assumption that the cloud is being managed by the MNO.We 
used the existing security features of GSM network to achieve 
authentication, data integrity and data confidentiality. 
In our proposed model, the SIM is the secure element 
which is being managed by the MNO. By using our model, a 
customer with a NFC enabled mobile phone can pay through 
his cell phone in a secure way. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section II consists of a 
brief introduction to NFC ecosystem with its main elements 
and functionalities. Section III describes the roles of Secure 
Element (SE) and the Universal Integrated Circuit Card 
(UICC) within the NFC ecosystem. Section IV evaluates the 
previously proposed NFC Cloud Wallet model. Section V 
discusses GSM authentication that is used in our extended 
model. Section VI introduces the proposed transaction model 
as well as the proposed transaction protocoland describes its 
execution process in details. Section VII is the analysis of our 
proposed model from multiple security aspects. This analysis 
encompasses the authentication and security of the messages 
among customer, shop POS terminal and the MNO. Finally, 
Section VIII presents our conclusion. 
II. NFC & NFC ECOSYSTEM 
This section describes the functions of adding the 
contactless card to mobile phones which produce an intelligent 
device that enables us to make payments with. This intelligent 
device is called a “NFC Mobile Phone”. When different 
functions of a mobile phone combine with the functions of 
contact-less cards, the results of this combination will have a 
greater significance than just the importance of adding two 
devices together. This significance defines the NFC-enabled 
mobile phone which can connect with another NFC-enabled 
device (i.e. PDA, tablets, etc.) in a short range communication 
channel. NFC technology enables users to benefit from new 
and countless services on a daily basis where they can pay for 
their food; buy a cinema ticket by scanning their phone against 
a movie poster and much more. This newly developed 
intelligent device is proposed as an all-in-one personal device 
that can be personalized and used in a highly interactive 
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environment [3]. Fig. 1 demonstrates the concept of the NFC 
mobile phone [4]. 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. The concept of NFC mobile phone 
The success of the NFC mobile ecosystem is based on the 
relationships between the involved parties where those 
relationships have to be clearly defined. The present 
contactless ecosystem models functionalities can be extended 
by a well-defined NFC ecosystem which improves the number 
of functionalities that an involved party can provide. Table I 
describes the key functionalities of NFC ecosystem [4]. 
TABLE I. KEY FUNCTIONALITIES OF NFC ECOSYSTEM 
Key functionalities  Description  
Service provisioning It provides authentication and remote user 
management due to network availability. Also users 
can subscribe and personalize their contactless cards. 
 
Mobile network 
provisioning 
It offers user authentication and user care for data 
connectivity as well as ensuring that the network 
infrastructure is maintained to enable users to receive 
data connectivity service. 
 
Trusted Service 
Manager (TSM) 
Delivers a communication platform between Service 
Providers (SPs) and NFC mobile phones where SPs 
provide multi-application management functionalities 
to NFC enabled mobile phone through this platform. 
 
III. SECURE ELEMENT (SE) 
The security of NFC is supposed to be provided by a 
component called security controller that is in the form of a 
SE. The SE is an attack resistant microcontroller more or less 
like a chip that can be found in a smart card [3]. 
SE provides storage within the mobile phone and it 
contains hardware, software, protocols and interfaces. SE 
provides a secure area for the protection of the payment assets 
(e.g. keys, payment application code, and payment data) and 
the execution of other applications. In addition, SE can be 
used to store other applications which require security 
mechanisms and it can also be involved in authentication 
processes. To be able to handle all these, the installed 
operating system has to have the capability of personalizing 
and managing multiple applications that are provided by 
multiple SPs preferably Over-The-Air (OTA). Still the 
ownership and control of SE within NFC ecosystem may 
result in a commercial and strategic advantage but some 
solutions are already in place and researchers are developing 
new models to overcome this problem. Universal Integrated 
Circuit Card is (UICC) is one of the most reliable components 
to act as a SE in NFC architecture [5]. It is removable, 
provides the same security as a smartcard, can run multiple 
applications issued by multiple providers, it is compliant with 
all smart card standards and it supports GSM and UMTS 
network. According to GSMA guidelines, UICC is the most 
appropriate NFC Secure Element in mobile phones [3]. 
A. SE Lifecycle 
The Initialization of an SE can be completed by different 
SE issuers such as credit card companies, Mobile Network 
Operator (MNO), financial institution or retailers. The SEI can 
also act as a platform provider. If the SE does not contain any 
applications when issued that means there is no platform 
manager assigned to that SE. A platform manager cannot deal 
with SE applications without having different certifications 
(i.e. Visa PayWave certification). 
The Activation process takes place when the SE is inserted 
into the phone.  The SE then sings in to the NFC controller 
and NFC controller sends a confirmation message to the 
platform manager in order to inform the platform manager of 
the successful insertion of the SE in the phone. The platform 
manager then sends a confirmation message to the mobile 
phone in order to activate the SE. The platform manager is the 
only party that has the authority to hold the SE keys for data 
configuration purposes. NFC controller’s identifier is also 
stored in the SE to inform SE in case if it was inserted into 
another phone.  
During phase 1 of the Applications Upload process, the SP 
(in this case also the Application Issuer (AI)) contacts the 
MNO that is the only party who is in charge of the Mobile 
Station International ISDN Number (MSISDN). The only way 
to classify the external party for an Over-The-Air (OTA) 
transaction with the NFC phone is the MSISDN. 
In phase 2, MNO forwards the SP request to the platform 
manager (s) that is in charge of the SE. If the there is no SE in 
the phone, the MNO will inform the SP regarding this issue.  
In this case application upload process terminates. But if 
the platform manager is positive with the request, it will send 
an offer directly to the SP to upload its application.  
In the next phase, SP selects one platform manager 
amongst others (if more than one platform manager exists) to 
load its data to the security domain area which is under the 
control of the same platform manager.  
The Deactivationprocedures are also managed by the 
platform manager where it can deactivate the SE, OTA in the 
case of theft or loss. If SE is installed in a new device, then the 
activation process should be renewed and the platform 
manager is the only party that should confirm the activation 
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process to enable the SE to be used for contactless transactions 
[5].  
IV. NFC CLOUD WALLET MODEL 
This model brought the idea of using cloud computing in 
order to manage the NFC payment applications which resulted 
in flexible and secure management, personalization and 
ownership of the applications [1].This architecture provides 
easy management of multiple users and delivers personalized 
contents to each user. It supports intelligent profiling functions 
by managing customized information relevant to each user in 
certain environments which updates the service offers and user 
profiles dynamically. Depending on the MNO network’s 
reception, deployment of this service takes around one minute 
and deployments can be scaled to any number of users. 
The idea of this approach is that every time the customer 
makes a purchase the payment application which contains the 
customer’s credentials is downloaded into the mobile device 
(SE) from the cloud and, after the transaction, it is deleted 
from the device and the cloud will update itself to keep a 
correct record of customer’s account balance. Fig. 2 illustrates 
the steps that should be undertaken to complete the transaction 
process [1]. 
The execution of the model is described in what follows: 
1) Customer waves the NFC enabled phone on the POS 
terminal to make the payment 
2) The payment application is downloaded into customer’s 
mobile phone SE. 
3) The reader communicates with the cloud provider to 
check whether the customer has enough credit or not. 
4) Cloud provider transfers the required information to 
the reader. 
5) Based on the information which was transferred to the 
reader, the reader either authorizes the transaction or rejects 
customer’s request. 
6) Reader communicates with the cloud to update 
customer’s balance - if customer’s request was authorised, the 
amount of purchase will be withdrawn from his account 
otherwise customer’s account will remain with the same 
balance.  
As an addition to this model, we suggest that when the 
NFC enabled phone sends a request to its cloud provider to get 
permission to make a payment (step 1), the cloud provider 
sends a SMS requesting a PIN number to identify the user of 
the phone - this is how cloud provider ensures the legitimacy 
of the phone user. For verification purposes, the customer 
sends the PIN back to the cloud provider as an SMS. 
In order to extend this model, there are two possible 
approaches to follow. Firstly, the financial institution can be 
the cloud owner from which the payment application can be 
downloaded from/into the customer’s mobile device; MNO 
can be linked to the financial institution (that is the cloud 
owner in this case) or it can stand as a separate party. 
Secondly, the financial institution could have a contract with a 
third party company such as PayPal that has its own cloud 
infrastructure (MNO can be linked with them, it also can stand 
as a separate party) or the financial institution uses other 
company’s cloud service such as IBM, Microsoft, etc (MNO 
can be linked with either financial institution, cloud provider 
or it can stand as a separate party). 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. NFC cloud wallet 
V. GSM AUTHENTICATION  
When a mobile device signs into a network, the Mobile 
Network Operator (MNO) first authenticates the device 
(specifically the SIM). The authentication stage verifies the 
identity and validity of the SIM and ensures that the subscriber 
has authorized access to the network. The Authentication 
Centre (AuC) of the MNO is responsible for authenticating 
each SIM that attempts to connect to the GSM core network 
through Mobile Switching Centre (MSC). The AuC stores two 
encryption algorithms A3 and A8, as well as a list of all 
subscribers identity along with corresponding secret key Ki. 
This key is also stored in the SIM. The AuC first generates 
a random number known as R. This R is used to generate two 
responses, signed response S and key Kc as shown in Fig. 3, 
where S = EKi (R) using A3 algorithm and Kc = EKi (R) using 
A8 algorithm [6][7][8][9]. 
The triplet (R, S, Kc) is known as Authentication triplet 
generated by AuC. AuC sends this triplet to MSC. On 
receiving a triplet from AuC, MSC sends R (first part of the 
triplet) to the mobile device. SIM of the mobile device 
computes the response S from R, as Ki is already stored in the 
SIM. Mobile device transmits S to MSC. If this S matches the 
S in the triplet (which it should in case of a valid SIM), then 
the mobile is authenticated.Kc is used for communication 
encryption between the mobile station and the MNO. Table 
IIdescribes the abbreviations used in the proposed protocol. 
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Fig. 3. Generation of Kc and S from R 
TABLE II. ABBREVIATIONS 
AuC Authentication Centre (subsystem of MNO) 
 
IMSI Internet Mobile Subscriber Identity 
 
Ki SIM specific key. Stored at a secure location in SIM and at AuC 
 
Kc Eki (R) using A8 algorithm 
 
Kc1 H(Kc). Used for MAC calculation 
 
Kc2 H(Kc.). Encryption key 
 
Kp Shared key between PG and shop POS terminal 
 
LAI Local Area Identifier 
 
MNO Mobile Network Operator 
 
NFC Near Field Communication 
 
PI Payment Information 
 
POS Point Of Sale. Part of shop 
 
R RAND. Random Number (128 bits) 
Rs Random number generated by SIM (128 bits) 
TC Transaction Counter 
TRM Transaction Request Message 
TI Transaction Information 
TMSI Temporary Mobile Subscriber Identity 
TP Total Price 
 
TSU User’s Time Stamp 
 
TSTr Transaction Time Stamp 
 
SD Shopping Details 
 
VI. PROPOSED MODEL  
We propose an extension to previously proposed NFC 
Cloud Wallet model. Since there are multiple options 
applicable to this model, we designed our model based on the 
following assumptions: 
 SE is part of SIM 
 Cloud is part of MNO 
 MNO is managing SE/SIM 
 Banks, etc. are linked with MNO 
These assumptions are appropriate regarding the NFC 
execution process and its ecosystem. As mentioned in Section 
IIIpreviously, SE is in the format of UICC therefore SE is part 
of the SIM. MNO manages the cloud infrastructure and it is 
the only party that has full access and permission to manage 
confidential data which are stored in the cloud. As MNO is the 
owner of the cloud, it fully manages the SIM in terms of 
monitoring the GSM network and controlling cloud’s data. 
From the financial institution’s point of view, they only deal 
with MNO as MNO is the single party that has full control 
over the SIM as well as the cloud. 
A. The Proposed Protocol 
Our proposal is based on cloud architecture where the 
cloud is being managed by the MNO. The cloud and the 
banking sector are the subsystems of MNO in our proposal, in 
addition to the existing subsystems of an MNO. We assume 
that the communication is secure between various subsystems 
of the MNO. The shop POS terminal, registered with one or 
more MNO, shares an MNO specific secret key Kp with the 
corresponding MNO. This key is issued once a shop is 
registered with the MNO. The bank detail of the shopkeeper is 
also registered with the MNO for monetary transactions. The 
communication between the shop POS terminal and the 
mobile device is wireless using NFC technology. The mobile 
device has a valid SIM. We used the existing feature of GSM 
network for mutual authentication. A recent study by 
reference [10] proposed a mechanism for GSM authentication 
in NFC environment. We tailored their model according to our 
requirement in our proposed architecture. The detailed 
execution of our protocol is described in Fig. 4. 
The proposed protocol executes in three different phases: 
Authentication, Keys generation and Transaction. The 
protocol initiates when the customer places his cell phone for 
the payment after agreeing to the total price displayed on the 
shop POS terminal. The details of these phases are described 
in what follows: 
B. Phase 1. Authentication 
Step 1: As soon as the user places his mobile device, NFC 
link between the mobile device and the shop POS terminal is 
established. The shop POS terminal sends an ID Request 
message to the mobile device. 
Step 2-3: The mobile device sends TMSI, LAI as itsID. On 
receipt of the information from the mobile device, the shop 
POS terminal determines the user's mobile network. The 
network code is available in LAI in the form of Mobile 
Country Code (MCC) and Mobile Network Code (MNC). An 
MNC is used in combination with MCC (also known as a 
‘MCC/MNC tuple’) to uniquely identify a mobile phone 
operator/carrier [11]. 
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Step 4-5: The shop POS terminal sends TMSI, LAI, and 
Shop ID to respective MNO for customer authentication and 
shop identification. 
Step 5.1: In case of incorrect TMSI, a declined message is 
sent. 
Step 6: In case of correct identification, the MNO 
generates one set of authentication triplet (R, S, Kc) and sends 
R to mobile device through shop POS terminal. 
Step 7-8: SIM computes Kc from R as explained in Section 
V. SIM generates a random number Rs and concatenates with 
R, encrypts with key Kc and sends it to the MNO through shop 
POS terminal. 
Step 9-10: The MNO checks the validity of the SIM (or 
mobile device). It receives EKc(R||Rs) from the mobile device 
and decrypts the message by Kc, the key it already has in 
authentication triplet. The MNO compares R in the 
authentication triplet with the R in the response. In case they 
do not match, a ‘Stop’ message is sent to the mobile device 
and the protocol execution is stopped. If both R are same, then 
the mobile is authenticated for a valid SIM. In this case, the 
MNO swaps R and Rs, encrypts with Kc and sends it to mobile 
device. 
 
Step 11-12: This step authenticates the MNO to the 
mobile device. The mobile device receives the response EKc 
(Rs||R) and decrypts it with the key Kc already computed in 
Step 7. The mobile device compares both R and Rs. If both are 
same, then the MNO is authenticated and a ‘successful 
authentication’ message is sent to the MNO. 
C. Phase 2. Key Generation and PIN Verification 
Step 13-14:Kp is a shared secret between the MNO and the 
shop POS terminal. Kc is the shared secret between the MNO 
and the customer's mobile device (computed in step 7). There 
is no shared secret between the POS terminal and the mobile 
device till this stage. MNO and mobile device compute one-
way hash function of Kc to generate Kc1, the key that will be 
used for MAC calculation. The MNO computes Kc2 from Kc1 
using one-way hash function and sends it to shop POS 
terminal by encrypting it with Kp. Mobile device also 
computes Kc2 as it already has Kc1 . Kc2 is the encryption key 
between MNO, shop POS terminal and the customer's mobile 
device. 
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Fig. 4. The proposed protocol 
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Step 15-17: The shop POS terminal sends the Total Price 
(TP) and the Receipt Number encrypted with Kc2. The user's 
mobile device decrypts the information and displays to the 
user. If he agrees, he enters the PIN. The PIN is an additional 
layer of security and adds trust between the user and the 
shopkeeper. A PIN binds a user with his mobile device, so the 
shopkeeper is to believe that the user is the legitimate owner 
of the mobile device. Moreover, the user feels more secure as 
no one else can use his mobile device for transaction without 
his consent. PIN is stored in a secure location in the SIM. The 
SIM compares both PINs and if both are same, the user is 
authenticated as the legitimate user of the mobile device. 
Otherwise, the protocol is stopped. 
D. Phase 3. Transaction 
Step 18: The customer's cell phone generates two 
messages, PI and TRM, such that;  
PI= Receipt No, Total Price, Time Stamp (TSU) 
TRM=PI, Rs, Transaction Counter 
 
Step 19:TSU represents the exact time and date the 
transaction has been committed by the user. TC is a counter 
that is incremented after each transaction and is used to 
prevent replay attack. PI is encrypted with Kc2 so that it can be 
verified by the shop POS terminal. The user encrypts the TRM 
with Kc so that it cannot be modified by the shop terminal. The 
user computes MAC with Kc1 over the TRM using Encrypt-
then-MAC approach for integrity protection. 
Step 20-21: The POS terminal can decrypt only the PI 
encrypted with by Kc2 to check its correctness. The POS 
terminal does not need to verify the MAC (and it cannot do 
so), as it already knows the main contents of PI. The Shop 
POS terminal also verifies the TSU to be in a defined time 
window. If PI is correct, the POS terminal relays the 
encrypted TRM with corresponding MAC along with the TSU 
to the MNO. 
Step 22: On receipt of the message, the MNO checks the 
integrity of the message by verifying the MAC with Kc1. If the 
MAC is invalid, the transaction execution is stopped. In case 
of a valid MAC, the MNO decrypts the message. The MNO 
compares the Rs in the TRM with the Rs received earlier in the 
authentication phase. A correct match confirms that the user is 
the same who was earlier authenticated.It also verifies the TC 
and TSU. In case of successful verification, the MNO 
communicates with the concerned subsections for monetary 
transaction. The concerned subsections of the MNO checks 
the credit limitations of the user, and if satisfied, executes the 
transaction. Once the transaction is executed, the MNO 
generates Transaction Information (TI) message as: 
TI = Transaction Serial Number, Amount, TSTr 
Step 23-25: The MNO encrypts TI with Kc2, digitally signs 
the message and sends it to the shop POS terminal. The POS 
terminal verifies the signature. A valid signature indicates 
correct TI. The POS also verifies the TI for the amount 
mentioned in the TI. In case of successful verification, the 
POS terminal appends the message it received from the MNO 
with the Shopping Details (SD) and corresponding digital 
signature. 
Step 26: The user verifies both signatures. It verifies the 
contents of TI and SD. 
VII. PROTOCOL ANALYSIS  
In this section, we analyse our proposed model from 
multiple security aspects. This analysis encompasses the 
authentication and security of the messages among customer, 
shop POS terminal and the MNO. The analysis also includes 
multiple attack scenarios, such as a customer is dishonest and 
has intentions to pay less, or the shopkeeper is dishonest and 
has plans to receive more money. 
A. Mutual Authentication 
A mutual authentication between a customer and MNO 
occurs whenever the customer agrees to pay some amount. 
Since this authentication is performed through shop POS 
terminal, we analysed our protocol from an angle that if the 
POS terminal has some malicious intentions. In this case, 
there can be following two scenarios: 
1) POS Terminal Impersonation as a Customer 
We assume that the shop POS terminal is dishonest and keeps 
a record of all messages against a legitimate customer (we call 
it as ‘target customer’). The aim of the shopkeeper is to 
transfer money from the target customer without his consent. 
The shop POS terminal impersonates as target customer to the 
MNO by replaying message 4. In case the TMSI and LAI are 
valid at that time (the chances are higher if the message is 
replayed just after the legitimate transaction of the target 
customer), the MNO will send a random number R to the 
terminal. R is 128 bit random number generated by the MNO 
so the chances for its repetition are almost negligible. The 
shopkeeper cannot compute a valid response in step 8 for a 
different R, as the shop lacks Ki to compute Kc. Therefore, a 
shop cannot successfully impersonate as a customer by 
replaying old messages. 
2) POS Terminal Impersonation as MNO  
In this scenario, we assume that the shop is dishonest and 
communicates with a target customer without establishing a 
communication link with the MNO. Again, we assume that the 
shop keeps a record of legitimate messages of the target 
customer. The shop sends message 1 (Request ID) to the target 
customer and gets its response in message 2. Since shop does 
not communicate with MNO in this scenario, it does not send 
message 4 to MNO. However, the shop replays the recorded R 
in message 6 to the target customer. The target customer 
believes that he has been correctly identified by the MNO and 
the R is actually generated the MNO. So the user computes a 
response and sends it in message 8 to the shop. Message 8 
contains Rs encrypted with the Kc. The Rs is a random number 
generated by the SIM and is different in each transaction. So, 
message 8 will be different than the one already recorded with 
the shop. Since message 8 is different, the shop can neither 
replay message 10, as it will be different for this transaction, 
nor it can compute a valid message 10. This scenario is, again, 
not successful. 
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B. Encryption and MAC Keys  
Separate keys are used for encryption and MAC 
calculation making the protocol more secure. Encrypt-then-
MAC is an approach where the ciphertext is generated by 
encrypting the plaintext and then appending a MAC of the 
encrypted plaintext. This approach is cryptographically more 
secure than other approaches [12]. Apart from cryptographic 
advantage, the MAC can be verified without performing 
decryption. So, if the MAC is invalid for a message, the 
message is discarded without decryption. This results in 
computational efficiency. 
C. User Interaction  
The user interaction with the system is reduced to single 
interaction making it a user-friendly protocol. The user feels 
more secure as the transaction is protected by PIN verification. 
There are chances that a user withdraws his mobile device 
from NFC terminal as a psychological move to enter PIN. 
This will break NFC link, but as the PIN is stored in the SIM, 
it does not require NFC link for verification. Once the user 
PIN has been verified by the SIM, the user places his mobile 
device back on the NFC terminal and the protocol resume 
from the same point. There are chances that a dishonest user 
withdraws his mobile device in order to enter the PIN, and 
then places back another mobile device for transaction. To 
counter this threat, Rs is transmitted by the mobile device in 
Transaction Request Message (message 19). Rs is generated by 
the SIM and is encrypted with Kc(message 7, 8), so it cannot 
be eavesdropped in the authentication phase. This ensures that 
the mobile device does not change. 
D. Disclosure of relevant Information  
The protocol is designed considering disclosure of 
information on a need to know basis. For example, TC is a 
counter that increments after each successful transaction. The 
record of the TC is kept by both, the user and the MNO. Shop 
POS terminal does not need to know the TC. In our proposed 
protocol, the TC is not exposed to POS terminal as it is a part 
of TRM. Similarly, the MNO does not need to know the 
shopping details of the customer. Therefore, only the total 
amount is transmitted to the MNO for transaction. 
E. Transaction security  
The transaction phase of the protocol requires maximum 
security. The TRM message is initiated by the customer rather 
than the shop terminal in order to satisfy the customer. The 
integrity of the TRM message is protected by the MAC so any 
alteration in this message is not possible. The message 19 is 
designed in such a way that the first half of the message 
containing encrypted PI is for shop POS terminal. POS 
terminal can decrypt and check the authenticity of the 
payment information. The remaining half of the message, 
containing encrypted TRM and corresponding MAC can 
neither be decrypted nor altered by the shop POS terminal. 
The POS terminal relays the remaining half to the MNO along 
with the Time Stamp. Hence, the transaction information 
generated by the customer is relayed to the MNO without any 
alteration.  
In this phase, there can be a scenario where a dishonest 
customer has an intention of paying less than the actual 
amount. The customer designs a malicious TRM message 
(TRM´) consisting of PI´ (an illegitimate payment information, 
PI´<PI). The dishonest customer then forms message 19 as: 
PI=Receipt Number, Total Price, Time Stamp TSU 
TRM´=PI´, Rs, Transaction Counter (TC) 
 
It may be noted that the PI is legitimate whereas, the TRM´ 
consists of amended PI (PI´). The dishonest customer forms 
message 19 as: 
Message 19 =Ekc2 (PI), EKc (TRM´), MACKc1 (TRM´) 
 
The first half of the message, consisting of encrypted PI, is 
legitimate and the shop can verify it. However, the malicious 
part cannot be decrypted by the shop, so the shop cannot 
determine that the remaining part contains amended price 
information. The shop forms message 21 as PI is verified. The 
MNO executes the transaction with amended price and forms 
message 23 and digitally signs it. Message 23 contains the 
information about the amount deducted from the customer. 
Once this message is received by the shop terminal, the shop 
detects that the deducted amount is not the same as required. 
Hence, a dishonest customer with the intention to pay a lesser 
amount does not succeed in our proposed design. 
F. New set of Keys for every transaction  
The keys are generated from random number R (generated 
by the MNO). The R acts as a seed for all keys. As R is fresh 
for every transaction, therefore the keys are also new in each 
transaction. 
G. Non-repudiation of transaction messages 
The transaction result messages (message 23, message 25) 
are digitally signed. In case of any dispute about the payment, 
the MNO is to honour message 23 as it contains the MNO's 
digital signature. The shopping detail is also digitally signed 
by the shop POS terminal so the shop has to honour the prices 
mentioned in this message. Therefore the customer is 
completely secured about the transaction. 
H. Securing long term secret  
Kp is the long term secret between MNO and shop POS 
terminal. In our protocol, Kpis used with the least exposure 
(only once). The security policy of the MNO can define the 
update of this key after a defined interval. 
VIII. CONCLUSION  
In this paper, we have proposed a transaction protocol that 
provides a secure and trusted communication channel to the 
communication parties. The proposed protocol was based on 
NFC Cloud Wallet model for secure cloud-based NFC 
transactions. The operations performed by the vendor’s reader, 
an NFC enabled phone and the cloud provider (in this paper 
MNO) are provided and such operations are possible by the 
current state of the technology as most of these measures are 
already implemented to support other mechanisms. We 
considered the detailed execution of the protocol and we 
showed our protocol performs reliably in cloud-based NFC 
transaction architecture. In addition, this paper provides other 
related issues that are required to be explored in order to find 
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out different possible roles, accesses and ownerships of 
involved parties in NFC ecosystem. The main advantage of 
this paper is to demonstrate another way of payment for all 
those people who do not have bank accounts. This way of 
making payments eases the process of purchasing for ordinary 
people as they only have to top up with their MNO without 
having to follow all the banking procedures. 
From the business and customers’ point of view, this 
method of payment is a micropayment, involving a very small 
amount for transactions (typically less than £50.00); therefore, 
people can only use this payment method to pay for cheap 
products. This has also prevented the emergence of such 
system, as the cost for individual transactions must be kept 
low which is impractical.  
A. Future work 
As a part of future work, a proof of concept 
implementation can be carried out in order to determine the 
reliability of the proposed protocol in terms of number of 
factors such as timing issues. This implementation refers to 
the performance domain of the proposed protocol which can 
be taken into the account to consider the performance of the 
protocol rather than its security that is discussed in this paper. 
The idea of the proposed protocol can also be extended to a 
multi-party protocol. Furthermore, other possible architectures 
in this area should be explored and defined in order to finalize 
the most reliable architecture for cloud-based NFC payment 
applications. 
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